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Abstract: Alternative investment vehicles, such as hedge funds, offer potentially 
high returns for investors willing to stomach the corresponding high-risks and 
opportunity costs. Additionally, depending on the fund’s methodology, some funds 
purport to offer limited market exposure in conjunction with their high return 
potential: they act as true “alternative” investments to the market. The objective of 
this paper is to analyze hedge funds to determine in what respects they are exposed 
to the market and systematic risk factors. Using a 21-year basis for data (1994-2015), 
we will examine fund performance versus the market for a variety of hedge indices. 
Our analysis provides insight into hedge fund performance during bull, bear, and 
crash market conditions. By capturing these market cycles, we can measure how 
exposed the hedge fund returns are to traditional measures of systematic risk in the 
market. Using a Macro-Market model for our fund returns, we characterize 
significant factors for modeling fund returns, with respect to each strategy we 
examine. The intra-strategy analysis allows us to both draw conclusions about 
market independence for each strategy and compare respective strategies over the 
21-year period. In conclusion, we determine to what extent our strategies offer an 
“alternative” investment. With the present popularity of hedge funds, understanding 
their correlation with market behavior is more important than ever. This paper strives 
to provide insight into that relationship and hedge fund dynamics in general. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
To understand how hedge funds act as alternative investments, we must consider how to model 
the returns of these funds. Previous efforts to model hedge fund returns are (logically) aimed at 
predictability and strategy implementation for respective funds and indices. While our concern is 
the macroeconomic factors affecting these returns, our analysis conducts a regression study 
similar to those conducted to examine strategies surrounding hedge funds.  
For instance, Amenc, El Bied, and Martellini (2002) performed a study of both 
predictability and tactical asset allocation for hedge fund returns.1 Brooks and Kat (2001) 
conducted a thorough statistical analysis of hedge fund returns, a study which this paper will 
reexamine.2 Both Hamza, Kooli, and Roberge (2006) and Avramov, Barras, and Kosowski 
(2013) characterize the predictability of hedge fund returns; however, HKR examines the use of 
tactical asset allocation as an investment strategy, while ABK devises a rationale behind fund 
predictability, based on fund characteristics.  
  This paper provides a basis for intra-fund comparison for investing strategies based on 
multiple regression. The implementation of our model is meant to determine variable 
significance and return correlation with the broader market; similar analyses could be carried out 
for mutual funds, bond funds, or alternative investments. The diversity of hedge fund strategies 
and their growth over the past decade make these funds prime candidates for this analysis. Using 
the data available from the Credit Suisse Hedge Fund Indices, we will conduct a statistical and 
                                                 
1 Their study includes a study of hedge fund return persistence and stability, as well as an extended Macro 
Model, measuring return exposure to systematic risks. Our study also develops a Macro Model for hedge 
fund returns; however, our model analysis stresses exposure to systematic risks, not predictability and 
strategy development surrounding the model. 
2 Their analysis considers monthly hedge fund returns for various indices from 1995 to 2001. By 
considering a larger pool of data in our study, 1994-2015, we can examine changes in the statistical 
properties of the returns and reevaluate the corresponding conclusions.  
modeling-based study of hedge fund returns. The analysis will individually cover each index, as 
they correspond to different hedge fund strategies: Convertible Arbitrage, Event Driven 
Strategies, and Emerging Markets for example.3 By stratifying the analysis by investment 
strategy, we characterize market exposure holistically for each strategy. Hence, we can gauge 
just how “alternative” investment strategies are within certain hedge funds. 
 By considering a 21-year period of available data, we can survey how hedge funds act in 
both bull and bear markets from a statistical standpoint. Finally, we will examine the exposure of 
hedge fund returns to both systematic risk and traditional drivers of equity returns. Using Fama 
and French (1992) and Carhart (1997) as bases for modeling fund returns, this paper measures 
hedge fund dependence on effects traditionally associated with equities and mutual funds. Hence, 
we will examine to what extent hedge funds offer alternative investments as compared to market, 
equity, and even mutual fund characteristics. The returns of these instruments have been written 
about extensively, compared to hedge funds. By characterizing hedge fund returns in greater 
detail, we can gain insight into market behavior and strategy development surrounding theses 
returns. 
Interdisciplinary Importance 
 
 This paper strives to characterize hedge fund returns in 3 respects: statistical properties, 
exposure to market growth and systematic risks, and exposure to drivers of mutual fund growth. 
By taking a holistic approach to studying the returns, this paper strives to understand how hedge 
funds act as alternative investments. With a record $3 trillion in assets-under-management (AUM) 
for hedge funds, the need for understanding their return properties is greater than ever.4 By 
                                                 
3 See Appendix, Figure 1 for description of each strategy studied in this analysis 
4 Source: http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/HF_Money_Under_Management.html 
considering the indices of different hedge fund strategies, we examine aggregate behavior for each 
strategy, not the performance of individual funds. By examining through a broader scope, this 
paper provides a basis for modeling returns for individual hedge funds, assuming they follow a 
strategy prescribed in the indices we examine. Predictability studies done on hedge fund returns 
benefit from both the statistical and market correlation analyses. Accordingly, strategies 
surrounding the hedge fund returns can also be adjusted to reflect fund behavior over their lifetime 
or in present market conditions. Our study provides a basis for future modeling of hedge fund 
returns, as well as adjusting present portfolio strategies.  
 Finally, hedge funds are mystifying as investment vehicles. Known primarily for offering 
more return with more risk (and less regulation), these funds stand apart from equities, ETFs, and 
options in their characteristics. Unlike like other publically traded securities, hedge funds maintain 
limited liability partnerships (LLPs) with their investors; this allows the funds to maintain limited 
liability for poor returns for their investors. Additionally, some fund managers may not be required 
to file public reports with the SEC, adding opaqueness to the fund’s characteristics and strategies.5 
By using a more holistic analysis towards their return properties, we attempt to demystify their 
characteristics and clarify the risks and benefits of the methodologies we consider. Comparing our 
results with those of similar studies, we can interpret how hedge funds are effected by market 
dynamics and how the returns change over time. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Source: https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answershedgehtm.html 
2 Review of Literature 
 
2.1 Hedge Fund Industry 
 
The hedge fund industry has expanded immensely over the past 20 years. From 230 billion in 
AUM in 2000, the industry has ballooned to over 3,000 billion. Stultz (2007) proposes that industry 
expansion can be attributed to hedge funds offering returns and investment strategies that 
traditional mutual funds cannot offer. By offering more diversified investment strategies, hedge 
funds have experienced more growth than the mutual fund sector in recent years. The largest 
contribution to hedge fund growth has come from large, institutional investors, willing to stomach 
high risk potentials.6 
However, with the rising popularity of hedge funds, strategies have become more 
sophisticated to offer lucrative returns to their investors. As money saturates funds following 
traditional hedge fund methodologies, capitalizing on mispriced assets becomes more completive 
and assets are priced more efficiently.7 This “return hunting” mandates that new techniques emerge 
to capitalize on market phenomena. Accordingly, the past decade has seen a rise in the Fund-of-
funds (FOF) investment strategy, wherein money is pooled and is invested following different 
strategies by multiple managers. FOF investment offers access to diverse securities, strategies, and 
risks; expertise is an expectation for money managers involved in FOFs. Unfortunately, the whole 
stock market suffered from the financial collapse of 2007-2008; 8 across strategies, hedge funds 
suffered losses and, by reducing exposure to the market, contributed to market decline. 
                                                 
6 Source: https://www.thehedgefundjournal.com/sites/default/files/citi_institutional_report1.pdf 
7 Stultz hypothesizes that this rise in pricing efficiency will reduce the average returns of hedge funds 
following these mispricing strategies (CON, EDD, EDRA, FIA, for example). Hence, the need for 
developing new strategies that can exploit other market characteristics. 
8 Notable strategies that were not adversely effected by the collapse include Dedicated Short Bias and 
Managed Futures; See Figure 1. 
 Following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, hedge funds faced both additional regulation and 
academic study, specifically surrounding how hedge funds affect systematic risks in the market. 
Kaal and Krause (2016) outline research on how hedge funds influence systematic risk, including 
the role they played in the crisis. Such studies prior to 2007 yield mixed results, with some 
suggesting that hedge funds disperse their diversified risk to a large number of investors. However, 
after 2007, studies have suggested that hedge funds contribute large liquidity risks; by liquidating 
large stock holdings, the funds catalyze falling prices and contribute to systematic risk.9  
Following the market collapse, the SEC began collecting data on hedge funds for 
measuring systematic risk associated with hedge funds. Additionally, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act 
created Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) for monitoring the financial practices of 
private, non-bank institutions, including hedge funds. Among its responsibilities, the FSOC is 
charged with making recommendations about financial regulation to Congress and determining 
which institutions qualify as systemically important to market dynamics.10 This wave of 
regulations has effected hedge funds by mandating more transparency to federal institutions 
about their investment strategies. Presumably looking to limit position leverage, the monitoring 
of the FSOC will likely push hedge funds to behave more like mutual funds: more stable 
institutions, offering unorthodox investment strategies to riskier investors. 
 Hedge funds are more mainstream than ever as an investment vehicle. Hence, 
understanding their influence on market dynamics and correlation with market movement is 
imperative for investor’s portfolio strategy, market makers, and regulators. By considering the 
                                                 
9 Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2011) perform a study of hedge fund market withdrawal during 
the crisis, finding the industry sold 29% of their aggregate portfolio in the last two quarters of 2008. 
Pressured by both their investors and leverage lenders, hedge funds sold high volatility securities and 
liquid assets as protection from market downturn. Hedge funds reacted more quickly to the collapse than 
mutual funds, who suffered greater losses by retaining more of their equity investments. 
10 Source: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096 
aggregate body of data available on hedge fund indices, our analysis offers broad-based 
conclusions about hedge fund strategies and their exposures. While industry is continuously 
changing and adapting, the mainstream strategies used offer little deviation from their 
prerogatives and provide a basis for comparing alternative returns.  
2.2 Stock Return Predictability 
There exists a huge body of work surrounding modeling investment returns for stocks. While not 
as extensive, analyses of mutual funds also strive to determine if their returns can be predictable 
and modeled appropriately. For our holistic analysis of hedge funds, we draw on these previous 
efforts to examine how hedge funds compare with different investment vehicles. The exposure of 
our hedge fund returns to regressors traditionally associated with market, stock, and mutual fund 
returns will be one of the bases for the analysis. 
Security return predictability is primarily studied in the context of portfolio strategy and 
optimization. Consider Sharpe (1964) who generalized portfolio’s based on an individual’s risk 
preference, introducing an asset-pricing model. Additionally, Sharpe (1966) performed analyses 
of like mutual fund returns to gauge money manager performance. This study introduced the 
Sharpe ratio as a basis for comparing like securities; accordingly, our study includes a true and 
modified Sharpe ratio for comparing hedge fund indices. 
Fama and French (1992, 1993) outlined how a firm’s size and book-to-market can be 
indicators of a stock’s average return, proving a basis for comparing like equities. Constructing a 
capital asset-pricing model (CAPM) expansion, the Fama-French 3-Factor Model models equity 
returns based on these indicators: small market cap and low book-market ratio. Their time series 
approach for examining exposure to “common risk” (systematic risk) is reutilized in our analysis. 
Carhart (1997) expanded the 3-Factor Model to include equity momentum, the tendency 
for a rising stock to continue rising, as an explanatory variable. Using the 4-Factor model, Carhart 
studied modeled mutual fund returns and concluded their returns were attributable in-part to these 
effects, not brilliant money management. Since some hedge funds also rely on money managers 
to invest, Carhart’s analysis lends itself to study how hedge funds are exposed to these factors. 
More recent studies of mutual fund return, such as Avramov (2006) and Kacperczyk (2005), also 
utilize the Carhart 4-factor model. Whether devising investment strategies or examining how 
mutual fund return has changed with industry evolution (as above, respectively), the Carhart model 
is used to determine two fund characteristics: exposure to market effects (value, small firm, and 
momentum) and significant excess returns. Our analysis utilizes both the 4-Factor and an extended 
Macro model for hedge fund returns with similar considerations in mind: exposure to systematic 
market risks and excess returns. 
Predictability and strategy have been two cornerstones of analysis for equity and mutual 
fund returns. Drawing on these efforts, our analysis studies hedge fund exposure to variables 
traditionally associated with market, equity, and mutual fund returns.  
2.3 Literature Gap 
 
Current analyses of hedge funds primarily consider predictability and corresponding investment 
strategies surrounding their returns. Our work serves a complementary piece to those analyses by 
reconsidering hedge funds statistically and rigorously examine how hedge funds act as alternative 
investments. By comparing hedge fund returns to market and mutual fund returns, we can 
characterize the exposures faced by hedge funds, as well as the significance of their returns.11 
                                                 
11 While return data will be considered from a “traditional” excess returns standpoint, there is a 
significant body of research indicating this measure is inept for hedge fund returns. Amin and Kat (2003) 
characterize both Jensen’s alpha and Sharpe Ratio as being inept at measuring hedge fund performance, 
Additionally, we can compare different facets of the hedge fund industry by gauging how fund 
strategy effects exposure to market returns and systematic risks. Doing so, we can determine how 
directional/non-directional (with the market) the strategies are, considering how well the strategies 
track market gains and losses. 
Our analysis has two primarily goals: characterize how hedge funds act as alternative 
investments and cross-examine hedge fund strategies for benefits and disadvantages. Finally, the 
scope of our analysis is the aggregate hedge fund industry. By considering index performances, 
we take consideration of only the largest portions (in AUM) of the industry. Hence, we ignore any 
abnormal success of smaller funds, but also inherit a survivorship bias from analyzing only the 
surviving, larger firms.12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
as return data tends to be non-normal and non-linear in relation with equity returns. Time-varying alphas 
are disparaging for analyzing excess returns. However, as part of our analysis, we will consider excess 
returns and Sharpe Ratios when comparing respective hedge fund strategies. 
12 Survivorship bias occurs when funds that have dissolved due to poor returns are not considered in 
measuring the returns of an index; these biases are most prominent in mutual and hedge funds.  Liang 
(2000) performs an analysis of hedge fund performance for “living” and dissolved funds. For the data 
considered, he finds an average bias of 2% per year, across different hedge fund methodologies; hence, 
returns are exaggerated by 2% when not considering dissolved funds. For our analysis, we do not take this 
or other biases under consideration. 
3 Analysis 
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3.1 Summary Statistics 
Figure 1 illustrates that, over the 21 years we consider, these indices display some common return 
characteristics, with varying degrees of volatility. Looking at 2007-2009, nearly every index, 
including the S&P, depreciates with the collapse of the housing bubble and Lehman Brothers. The 
lone exception, DSB, maintains a net short market position and bolstered in the crash market of 
the collapse. During the 2002-2005 bull market, all funds, minus DSB, appreciate, with GM and 
MF experiencing the highest returns over this period; this trend repeats following 2010 as well.  
Most indices also display large volatilities, gaining and losing very quickly compared to the 
market. Clearly, there is some interaction between S&P movements and hedge fund returns. 
Developing a holistic characterization of this interaction is the objective of subsequent analysis. 
 By considering monthly returns, Figure 1 represents a smoothed net asset value plot. The 
volatility of each index is actually greater than what analyzing monthly returns indicates, as indices 
vary on a daily basis. Additionally, return data may be subject to the discretion of money managers, 
who self-report their individual fund returns.13 However, since our analysis considers industry 
indices, we will neglect smoothing efforts by individual managers; we will take smoothing from 
using monthly data into consideration in our study. 
Note that some of the indices follow very similar strategies and some funds’ return date 
are dependent on one another; for example, All is a compound index of all the other funds 
considered. In Figure 1, ED, LS, and EDM track each other extremely closely. However, 
throughout our analysis, we will consider each strategy’s characteristics independently of each 
                                                 
13 Cassar and Gerakos (2011) find evidence that funds with more manager discretion for pricing fund 
value display evidence of intentional smoothing. Additionally, they find asset illiquidity in fund positions 
to be a driver of the properties of self-reported returns. 
other for completeness.14 Accordingly, we can compare event-driven and arbitrage strategies 
against one another to understand how strategy changes influence their return profiles.   
Table 1 displays an arithmetic summary of monthly real-return percentages for each 
industry index and the S&P 500 (our market proxy). Of the hedge funds, 6 offer average returns  
 
Summary Statistics: Credit Suiss Hedge Fund Indices Monthly Return Data 
1/1994 to 1/2015  (%ages) 
Fund 
Methodology Mu Sigma Skewness Kurtosis Min Max 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
Non- Adj. 
Sharpe 
Ratio 
All 0.6798 2.0570 -0.3261 3.0736 -7.8493 8.1837 0.2224 0.3305 
Convertible 
Arbitrage 0.5587 1.9379 -3.0503 20.2782 -13.4583 5.6450 0.1736 0.2883 
Dedicated 
Short Bias -0.4648 4.6633 0.5292 0.9863 -11.9704 20.4667 -0.1473 -0.0997 
Emerging 
Markets 0.5840 4.1090 -1.2673 8.0961 -26.1703 15.1995 0.0880 0.1421 
Equity-
Market 
Neutral 0.3832 3.4775 -13.5593 203.7372 -51.8404 3.5928 0.0463 0.1102 
Event Driven 
0.7251 1.7858 -2.4131 12.8178 -12.5274 4.1321 0.2816 0.4061 
Event Driven 
Distressed 0.8015 1.8558 -2.4027 13.6586 -13.3015 4.0691 0.3121 0.4319 
Event Driven 
Multi-
Strategy 0.6877 1.9259 -1.9187 9.1158 -12.2442 4.6703 0.2417 0.3571 
Event Driven 
Risk 
Arbitrage 0.4851 1.1719 -1.0284 4.9539 -6.3521 3.7396 0.2243 0.4140 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 0.4325 1.6084 -5.0207 39.5292 -15.1235 4.2436 0.1307 0.2689 
Global Macro 0.8715 2.6302 -0.1812 4.7491 -12.2745 10.0721 0.2468 0.3313 
Long/Short 
Equity 0.7434 2.7115 -0.2523 3.7633 -12.1433 12.2284 0.1922 0.2742 
Managed 
Futures 0.4824 3.3230 -0.0777 0.0040 -9.8211 9.4873 0.0783 0.1452 
Multi-
Strategy 0.6500 1.4857 -1.8852 7.3543 -7.6311 4.1882 0.2881 0.4375 
S&P 500 0.6702 4.3115 -0.7060 1.2002 -16.9425 10.7723 0.1039 0.1554 
 
Column Min Column Max 
                                                 
14 Additionally, the Event Driven, Long/Short Equity, and S&P 500 returns demonstrate degrees of 
multicollinearity with other indices. For a complete breakdown of return association, see Appendix Figure 
2 for a complete look at strategy correlation. 
Table 1 
 
 which exceed the market and 10 offer Sharpe Ratios which exceed that of the market. However, 
Sharpe ratios are consistently overestimated in this framework, including with the S&P. Volatility 
smoothing that results from using monthly data makes Sharpe ratio comparison ambiguous. Where 
S&P volatility can be calculated with more accuracy, hedge funds offer only monthly return data, 
perhaps to smooth excess volatility.15 Regardless, certain strategies offer excess market returns, 
while some seriously underperform the market; here and for the rest of the analysis, DSB will 
generally behave as an outlier, as it bets against the market as a strategy.  
 The return distributions also display consistent negative skewness and high kurtosis, 
compared to a standard normal with a skewness of 0 and a kurtosis of 3. Negative skewness implies 
that monthly losses tend to tail off, being more severe than monthly gains; this can be seen 
comparing the min and max columns. Even with S&P returns, large losses tend to be more frequent 
than large gains. The distributions also demonstrate high kurtosis, implying they are highly 
centralized; in this case, they are centralized on the interval (-1,2). Notable exceptions to this 
centralization are All, DSN, MF, and the S&P. Oddly, All is the distribution that most closely 
resembles a standard normal, but the indices that contribute to All are non-normal (See Figure 2).16 
Again, DSB deviates from the rest of the market by demonstrating positive skewness and non-
centralization. Since we consider a 21-year basis for hedge fund returns, there are studies which 
use subsets of these distributions in their data analyses. We can our compare statistical results with 
                                                 
15 Kat and Brooks (2001) find Sharpe ratios to be inept comparison tools as well. Traditional mean-
variance analysis loses meaning when considering the lower-frequency data and distributional properties 
of hedge fund returns. 
16 The pseudo-normality of All can be viewed as a manifestation of the Central Limit Theorem. By 
considering aggregate return data from all the indices, All’s distribution approaches the hedge fund 
industry’s true characteristics. 
those of other hedge fund studies to understand how returns have changed over time with market 
trends. 
 
Figure 2  
 
 Comparing our statistics to Kat and Brooks’ (K. and B. hereafter) (2001) breakdown of 
monthly hedge fund returns, returns have changed over time. While they use different databases, 
they consider some of the same strategies and market metrics in their analysis. Generally, sigma, 
skewness, and kurtosis resemble our findings. However, mean monthly return has decreased over 
time for CON, EDRA, EDD, LS, and EMN. Accordingly, All has also declined; the lowest average 
return among K. and B’s considered databases for the aggregate hedge fund market is 1.13%. Our 
calculated mean of .6798% constitutes about 60% of the average return K. and B. found over the 
period 1995-2001; S&P average return today constitutes only 43% of what K. and B. found as 
well.17 The stagnation of average fund returns could be attributed to the 2008 market crash or 
                                                 
17 While hedge fund returns have stagnated, market returns have actually stagnated more. This trend 
could contribute to the growth of the hedge funds over the past few decades: in an environment where the 
market appreciates slower and slower, why not seek out alternative investments that are more resilient to 
return stagnation? 
uncharacteristically high returns during K. and B.’s analysis, 1995-2001. Another hypothesis, 
however, is that the expansion of the hedge fund industry actually drives down average returns for 
all funds. As Stulz (2007) describes, as AUM in hedge funds rise, that money goes towards, 
generally, securities with price discrepancies to generate a profit.18 By raising the amount of money 
targeting those securities, the discrepancies are eliminated faster and the strategies become less 
profitable. Hence, the growth of money in hedge funds actually reduces the effectiveness of their 
strategies and reduces average returns, a possible explanation for stagnating returns. 
 Our statistical analysis allows us to compare fund performances versus the market and infer 
about industry evolution. Considering the shape of the return distribution is integral to defining 
how hedge funds behave as alternative investments. However, while summary statistics can 
capture average fund metrics vs. the market, it provides no information on how the indices are 
effected by market movements. Figure 1 illustrates that there is some correlation between market 
conditions and the growth in hedge fund indices; however, our statistical analysis does not provide 
a comparison for performance in bull and bear markets.19 To characterize the relationship between 
market and hedge fund returns, we will consider a regression and correlation analysis of the 
returns. By utilizing capital asset pricing models associated with equities and mutual funds, we 
can compare hedge funds to these securities, in terms of their market exposure. 
3.2 Return Market Exposure  
For gauging alternativeness for each fund, we can measure market exposure in terms of a 
simplified Capital Asset Pricing Model, outlined by Sharpe (1964). Determining the simple market 
Beta for each strategy allows for cross comparison between strategy; presumably, directional 
                                                 
18 Arbitrage and event-driven strategies especially focus on mispriced securities; whether convertible 
bonds or stocks in distress, heavier investment in these securities mitigates strategy profitability. 
19 For a statistical comparison of hedge fund performance in bear and bull markets, see Appendix Figure 
3 and Figure 4: a stratified look at the data contained in Table 1. 
strategies offer significant market betas, while non-directional strategies do not. As certain 
strategies purport to maintain gains across market conditions, simple market beta provides basic 
insight into average market conditions. Finally, we expect to see some significant excess returns 
to justify investors seeking out alternative investments.  
𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝟏: 20   𝐑𝐢 =   𝛂 + (𝛃𝐌𝐊𝐓 ∗ 𝐱𝐢) +  𝛆𝐢 
 
Simple Market Betas 
Methodology 𝛃𝐌𝐊𝐓 
 
𝛂 
 
All 1.2001* -0.1456 
CON 0.8191* 0.2126 
DSB -0.7025* 0.3436 
EM 0.5682* 0.3384 
EMN 0.3357* 0.5416* 
ED 1.5248* -0.4354 
EDD 1.4319* -0.4774* 
EDM 1.3078* -0.2292 
EDRA 1.8397* -0.2223 
FIA 0.8972* 0.2822 
GM 0.3811* 0.3380 
LS 1.0726* -0.1272 
MF -0.0970 0.7170* 
MS 1.1402* -0.0456 
S&P 500  1.0000* 0.0000 
 
Column Min Column Max 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Note this model does not risk-adjust returns as Jensen (1968) does by considering returns over the risk 
free rate. By utilizing the simplified model, we wanted to provide as much evidence towards alpha 
significance as possible.  
Table 2: Ri denotes monthly hedge fund return, xi denotes 
corresponding S&P monthly return. Note the color scale maps low-to- 
high in blue-to-red. All significance testing is performed with a 95% 
confidence level and significance is denoted by *. 
 
Table 2 diverges from our original inferences about hedge fund behavior. While 
directionless strategies CON, EMN, FIA, and EMN maintain lower betas than directional 
strategies, they still maintain significant positive market association in their betas. Every fund, 
besides MF, is significantly exposed to the market: DSB showing negative association, the rest 
positive. Finally, only EMN and MF offer significant excess returns over the market. Only the MF 
index sits in the favorable position of offering excess returns with insignificant market exposure, 
one of the purported benefits of alternative hedge fund investment. The event-driven strategies 
display betas comparable to equities, but offer alphas showing signs of significant excess losses 
compared to market returns. Generally, the indices display significant market betas and non-
significant excess returns, as the metrics of All indicate. Table 2 illustrates that even alternative 
investments experience significant market exposure. 
 While simple market betas illustrate on average how volatile strategies are with the market, 
they fail to describe market association across different market conditions. Presumably, as the 
market fluctuates, the return profile of the hedge funds also changes;21 the diverse investments of 
the funds also expose them to a diverse set of risks. However, alternative investments should 
maintain some degree positive returns in presence of bearish market conditions: otherwise, why 
seek out alternative investment? Non-directional strategies especially should offer similar return 
profiles across bull and bear markets. 
 To examine bull market vs bear market performance for the indices, we will reclassify 
monthly S&P returns into two data classes: strictly positive and strictly negative. We classify 
months in which the market had a positive yield as bull, with negative yield implying a bear month. 
By regressing index returns on these two data sets, we generate two market betas: one bull and one 
                                                 
21 See Appendix Figure 3 and Figure 4 
bear (See Model 2). The new model offers a stratified version of Model 1 which measures index 
exposure to bull and bear periods, respectively. Accordingly, strategies can be evaluated in terms 
market correlation, across market conditions. 
𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝟐: 22   𝐑𝐢 =  𝛂 +  (𝛃𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥 ∗ 𝐱𝐢
+) + ( 𝛃𝐁𝐞𝐚𝐫 ∗ 𝐱𝐢
−) +  𝛆𝐢 
 
Methodology 𝛃𝐁𝐮𝐥𝐥 𝛃𝐁𝐞𝐚𝐫 
All 0.1948* 0.3423* 
CON 0.0846 0.2369* 
DSB -0.9245* -0.7312* 
EM 0.2900* 0.7156* 
EMN 0.1287 0.2975* 
ED 0.1480* 0.3619* 
EDD 0.1190* 0.3945* 
EDM 0.1637* 0.3468* 
EDRA 0.1048* 0.1634* 
FIA -0.0218 0.2543* 
GM 0.0950 0.1832* 
LS 0.3794* 0.4638* 
MF 0.1290 -0.2224* 
MS 0.0726 0.1905* 
S&P 500  1.0000* 1.0000* 
 
Column Min Column Max 
 
 
 Table 3 displays the stratified market betas for each index, a decomposed version of the 
βMKTs from Table 2. Ideally, the indices would maintain significant, positive βBulls and significant, 
negative βBears, maintaining positive returns across all market conditions. However, the indices 
                                                 
22 The two regressors of the models are modified forms of the monthly returns of the S&P. xi
+ is defined 
as max(S&Pi , 0) , while  xi
− is defined as min(S&Pi , 0). By stratifying the S&P returns, we can 
decompose the simple market betas outlined in Table 2. 
Table 3: Ri denotes hedge fund return for each strategy, 
xi
+denotes non-negative market returns and xi
− denotes non-
positive market returns. Significance denoted with *. 
 
display more significant association with bear markets than bull markets. All indices except DSB 
and MF maintain significant, positive association with bear markets, indicating an inability to 
maintain positive returns during bear markets. Meanwhile, only EM, LS, and the event driven 
strategies maintain significant, positive association with bull markets. While these strategies are 
generally directional, they all display more significant association with losses during bear markets, 
with larger positive βBear’s. Accordingly, they lose money faster in bear markets than they gain in 
bear markets. Even DSB, which takes a short position in the market, loses far more in bull markets 
than it gains in bear markets.23 Again, the aggregate All index captures the fund tendency: positive 
exposure to market growth, but more significant positive exposure to market loss. MF is the only 
fund that maintains significant gains in bear markets, while maintains some degree of gains in bull 
markets. 
 By decomposing simple market betas, we can see that generally indices, regardless of 
strategy, maintain more significant exposure to market losses than to market gains. While some 
funds maintain significant excess gains over the market, they stand to lose value quickly in bear 
markets. Perhaps, as Stulz (2007) outlines, the lack of leverage restrictions makes hedge funds 
extremely sensitive to market shocks. Market drops can pressure over-leveraged positions to 
liquidate and repay lenders, likely incurring a loss on the position being liquidated. While leverage 
can greatly improve growth potential, it places a large liquidity risk on the assets when they 
depreciate. Hence, the indices generally capture market growth, but are more significantly exposed 
to market losses, even for directionless strategies. By decomposing simple βMKTs, we see how the 
indices grow or shrink across bull and bear conditions. 
                                                 
23 The betas can be interpreted, respectively, as %age of bull and bear market growth/loss captured by the 
fund. Hence, the S%P captures 100% of S&P growth in bull markets and 100% of S&P loss during bear 
markets. 
3.3 Extended and Carhart Models 
While these indices do maintain significant market exposure, perhaps “alternative” implies 
independent of systematic market risk. Academic literature has detailed analyses of stock, mutual 
fund, and hedge funds, prying for indicators of security returns. Outside of the traditional CAPM 
used in Model 1, extended models offer a larger number of explanatory variables to measure 
significance. However, these models can suffer from subtractive predictive power if too many 
variables are included: the effects of one variable may not be distinct from another, leading to 
convoluted models with little predictive application.  
 Balancing this tradeoff, we model the hedge fund index returns using regressors 
traditionally utilized in measuring equity exposure to systematic risks. Drawing on previous 
efforts, we prescribed variables representing a cross-section of undiversifiable market risk.24 With 
these variables, we modeled the index returns, as summarized in Table 4. The variables used in 
our extended model include: 
Unemp: Unemployment Rate – Serving as a lagging economic indicator, economy growth 
generally implies a drop in employment, as jobs are being created. 
WTI: West Texas Intermediate – Used as a benchmark for oil prices affecting American industry 
and consumption. 
VXO: S&P 100 Volatility Index – Measuring the implied volatility of various options for the 
largest 100 US companies, this index serves as a fear gauge, like the VIX. 
SR: Savings Rate – A measure of average money saved from paychecks, a high savings rate 
indicates slowed consumer consumption. 
BS: Bond Spread – Defined as the difference between BAA and AAA corporate bond yield, with 
risky bonds needing larger yields to attract investors in volatile markets, indicating systematic risk. 
TS: Treasury Spread – Defined as difference between 10-year and 3-month yield, this is a proxy 
for credit risk in the market, stemming from changing interest rates. 
Gold: Gold Price/oz. – A leading market indicator, this commodity experiences growth in the 
face of market uncertainty. 
                                                 
24 Bali, Brown, and Caglayan (2014) and Amenc, El Bied, and Martellini (2002) in particular outline 
similar cross-sections for modeling hedge fund returns. Drawing on their models, we selected our variable 
set and checked the variables for serial correlation to mitigate subtractive predictive power. See Appendix 
Figure 5, the correlation matrix for our variables. 
MS: Money Supply – Here, the M1 money supply proxies for liquidity risk and inflation in the 
market, as it measures liquid portions of American currency. 
 
𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝟑:    𝐑𝐢 =   𝛂 + (𝛃𝐔𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐩 ∗ 𝐱𝟏𝐢) + (𝛃𝐖𝐓𝐈 ∗ 𝐱𝟐𝐢) + (𝛃𝐕𝐗𝐎 ∗ 𝐱𝟑𝐢) + (𝛃𝐒𝐑 ∗ 𝐱𝟒𝐢)
+ (𝛃𝐁𝐒 ∗ 𝐱𝟓𝐢) + (𝛃𝐓𝐒 ∗ 𝐱𝟔𝐢)   + (𝛃𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝 ∗ 𝐱𝟕𝐢) + (𝛃𝐌𝐒 ∗ 𝐱𝟖𝐢) +  𝛆𝐢 
 
Extended Macro Model: Systematic Risk Measure 
 
Methodology 𝛂  𝛃𝐔𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐩 𝛃𝐖𝐓𝐈 𝛃𝐕𝐗𝐎 𝛃𝐒𝐑 𝛃𝐁𝐒 𝛃𝐓𝐒 𝛃𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝 𝛃𝐌𝐒 
All 
0.7061* -0.8318 0.0443 0.0686* 0.0501 -6.8949* 0.0586 0.0048 -0.0067 
CON 
0.6191* 0.2257 0.0639* 0.0520* -0.0649 -9.1748* -0.2455 0.0052 -0.0112 
DSB 
-0.2759 1.3255 -0.0381 0.0464 -0.7104 6.8996* -2.7365* -0.0086 -0.0225 
EM 
0.5405* -2.6687 0.0061 -0.0155 0.2054 
-
11.2214* 1.0205 0.0159* -0.0015 
EMN 
0.7181* -3.4870* 0.1197* 0.2554* 0.0521 -7.5317* 2.9840* -0.0078 -0.0454* 
ED 
0.7629* -1.0836 0.0318 0.0482 0.1103 -6.4375* 0.5906 0.0042 -0.0076 
EDD 
0.8523* -1.2511 0.0229 0.0429 0.1207 -6.2434* 0.8570 0.0026 -0.0085 
EDM 
0.7199 -1.0902 0.0396 0.0565 0.1163 -6.7132* 0.3322 0.0048 -0.0073 
EDRA 
0.5026 -0.0968 0.0384* -0.0357 0.0439 -1.5624* 0.0912 0.0030 -0.0043 
FIA 
0.5033* -0.8064 0.0603* 0.0918* 0.0474 -7.0480* -0.5444 0.0022 -0.0121* 
GM 
0.8901* -0.0271 0.0219 0.0605 -0.0329 -4.9989* -0.2012 0.0075 -0.0062 
LS 
0.7040* -1.2731 0.0702 0.0180 0.1261 -7.3350* 0.1482 0.0058 0.0014 
MF 
0.4076 1.0523 -0.0429 0.0774 -0.3196 -1.1962 -0.3119 0.0101 0.0067 
MS 
0.6844* -0.9586* 0.0517* 0.0794* 0.0533 
-6.7649* 
0.1081 0.0041 -0.0070 
S&P 500  
0.5605* -3.5491* 0.0592 -0.1473* 0.5102 -9.8212* 0.3327 0.0013 0.0128 
 
Significance* 
 
 
 
Table 4: Ri corresponds to index return, α corresponds to excess return, and xki 
corresponds to the month over month change in the variable defined in the 
respective beta (x1i corresponds to month over month change in unemployment 
rate, for example). 
 
 Our extended model shows that that hedge funds vary by strategy in exposure to 
systematic risk. Strategies, like CON, EMN, FIA, and MS, show considerable exposure to our 
variable basis, while LS, GM, and the event driven strategies show little far less exposure. All 
indices demonstrate significant excess returns, except DSB and MF, which show minor exposure 
altogether; the market also displays significant excess returns.25 Overall, the indices show 
resilience to these sources of systematic risk, producing significant returns, in excess of the 
market in some cases. 
 Considering the betas of Model 3, βWTI, βVXO, and βBS display the most significance  
across the indices.26 The indices and the market display significant negative exposure to bond 
spread, heavily depleting returns during periods of market uncertainty. Counterintuitively, the 
indices display positive exposure to market volatility in the VXO, improving returns with higher 
volatility, contrasting with the market returns which deteriorate. Perhaps, through the use of 
options or some rise in mispricing during the periods, the indices capitalize on volatile market 
conditions, whereas S&P investors withdraw money and drive value down. Indices generally 
maintain long positions in oil prices and suffer from rises in employment, save CON, DSB, and 
MF. Overall, commodity exposure was menial for the indices, between oil and gold, while 
savings rate and money supply offered little significance for both the market and the indices. 
 Overall, the indices display similar systematic risk exposures compared to market, under 
our variable basis. Individual strategies, like EMN and FIA, display more exposure than other 
                                                 
25 The S&P showing significant excess returns can be interpreted as Model 3 not adequately capturing 
systematic risk in the market place, driving market prices. Permutations of the variable list also yielded 
this result, indicating some significant sources of market risk are not included in this model. 
26 Note that the xkis are correspond to monthly change in the variable considered, for ease of beta 
interpretation. For instance: βWTI corresponds to the change in percentage monthly return per dollar 
change price of a barrel of oil, βBS corresponds to change in monthly return percentage per percent 
change in bond spread. 
indices and the market, but the overall exposure of hedge funds is limited. MF paradoxically 
displays no significant variable exposure, but also no significant excess return: the model as a 
whole account for significant return variation in its basis, but no one variable maintains 95% 
significance in its association. Our basis reveals the All index maintaining comparable 
systematic exposure that the market does. From an alternative standpoint, the indices do benefit 
more on average from market volatility than the actual market does, while suffering less from 
credit risk. However, both the market and hedge funds maintain diverse risk exposures, likely 
outside of the scope of our basis. The indices indicate that they do maintain alternative 
systematic risk exposures, compared to the market. From this standpoint, we can conclude that 
the indices differ with one another in exposure to systematic risk, but, within our basis, operate 
similarly to the market: with respect to market returns, the indices maintain alternative 
systematic risk profiles. 
 With alternative risk profiles in mind, our final model gives consideration to if hedge 
funds behave similarly to mutual funds. With both security types investing according to a money 
manager’s guidance, the criteria used for determining valuable assets may be similar between the 
two fund types. Unlike hedge funds, mutual funds maintain publically available holdings and are 
regularly audited, more transparency with their shareholders than hedge funds.27 While mutual 
funds have more legal restrictions than hedge funds, their investment strategies, like hedge funds, 
depend on finding mispriced securities and taking positions speculating on the price changes. 
Utilizing the persistence framework of Carhart (1997), we can compare index exposure to the 
excess returns of small firms over big firms, high book-to-market over small book-to-market, 
and momentum stocks. Carhart determined the 4-factor model accounted for nearly all the 
                                                 
27 Source: https://www.thebalance.com/regulations-of-mutual-funds-2466589 
variation in expected mutual fund return, primary due to the SMB and MOM factors. By 
comparing index exposures to the exposures Carhart original findings for mutual funds, we can 
qualitatively compare investment strategies. While the time frames of the two studies are 
different, the non-dynamic strategies of the indices likely maintain exposures across both time 
bases, warranting the exposure comparison. 
𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝟒:  𝐑𝐢  −  𝐑𝐟𝐢 =   𝛂 + (𝛃𝐌𝐊𝐓−𝐑𝐅 ∗ 𝐱𝟏𝐢) +  (𝛃𝐒𝐌𝐁 ∗ 𝐱𝟐𝐢) + (𝛃𝐇𝐌𝐋 ∗ 𝐱𝟑𝐢) + (𝛃𝐌𝐎𝐌 ∗ 𝐱𝟒𝐢) + 𝛆𝐢 
Carhart 4-Factor Model: Likeness to Mutual Funds 
 
Methodology 𝛂  𝛃𝐌𝐊𝐓−𝐑𝐅 𝛃𝐒𝐌𝐁 𝛃𝐇𝐌𝐋 𝛃𝐌𝐎𝐌 
All 0.1972* 0.3198* 0.0504 0.0321 0.1198* 
CON 0.2125 0.1644* 0.0224 0.0999* -0.0290 
DSB -0.1686 -0.8444* -0.1873* 0.0462 -0.0706* 
EM -0.0074 0.5474* 0.1315 -0.0079 0.1015* 
EMN -0.0307 0.2152* 0.0835 0.2114* -0.0278 
ED 0.2897* 0.2748* 0.1080* 0.0917* 0.0425* 
EDD 0.3858* 0.2658* 0.1179* 0.0798* 0.0238 
EDM 0.2312* 0.2861* 0.0991* 0.1063* 0.0590* 
EDRA 0.1526* 0.1446* 0.0354 0.0536* 0.0089 
FIA 0.1033 0.1277* 0.0395 0.0976* -0.0107 
GM 0.4785* 0.1798* 0.0043 0.0267 0.1074* 
LS 0.1442 0.4990* 0.0978* -0.0343 0.1971* 
MF 0.2296 -0.0329 0.0544 0.0164 0.1092* 
MS 0.3106* 0.1429* 0.0391 0.0666* 0.0100 
S&P 500  -0.1286* 0.9543* -0.1004* -0.0033 -0.0529* 
 
Significance* 
 
 
Table 5: The Model is the true Carhart (1997) model, incorporating market 
returns over the risk free rate, excess returns by small firms over large, excess 
returns by high book-to-market firms, and momentum equities as the xkis for 
modeling hedge fund return over the risk free rate. 
 
Table 5 shows the indices’ exposure to the traditional drivers of mutual fund return. As 
Carhart originally found within mutual fund returns, there is evidence of momentum in hedge 
fund returns, with exposure to various market effects, though not at the same magnitude as 
mutual funds.28 Market betas aside, the indices display similar exposure levels to the value effect 
in βHML and to momentum stocks in βMOM, both with 8/14 indices displaying significant betas. 
The indices demonstrate limited exposure to the small-firm effect, with event-driven strategies, 
LS, and DSB having significant βSMBs. Note that only some of the alphas in Model 4 display 
significant excess returns, namely the event driven strategies, GM, and MS. Compared with 
Model 3, Model 4 captures far more variation in the index returns, leading to less alpha 
significance. This implies that the indices are more exposed to market phenomena which drive 
mutual fund returns than to larger systematic risks effecting the market. Generally, the money 
managers of both fund types try to exploit value, small firm, and momentum equities in 
maintaining returns. 
Model 4 illustrates that hedge funds maintain similarities with mutual funds; the lack of 
significant excess returns for 6 funds testifies to money managers adopting similar equity 
valuation strategies. However, like Model 3, several strategies display excess returns over the 
variable basis. Hedge fund returns demonstrate a diversity of exposures in their returns, 
including traditional systematic risk indicators and drivers of mutual fund returns. A rigorous 
model of hedge fund returns would entail a large variable basis, including elements of Models 3 
                                                 
28 Baquero, Horst, and Verbeek (2005) strengthen this conclusion, concluding that hedge funds 
demonstrate more persistence than mutual funds. They theorize this may be due to restricted capital 
movement for hedge funds, relative to mutual funds who may move money with more liquidity. We 
reevaluate this finding in Appendix Figure 6, defining autocorrelations for the indices, for a variety of lag 
times and period bases. 
and 4.29 However, diagraming return variation for one strategy might not diagram another 
strategy with the same sophistication. With closely held portfolios and investment strategies, 
holistically documenting hedge fund exposure, even for well-defined strategies, is not feasible.30 
Again, the diversity of exposures sourcing hedge fund returns makes the funds difficult to 
sufficiently model. Alternative investment again partially maintains the exposure profile of a 
traditional investment vehicles: in this case, mutual funds.  
4. Major Findings 
 
 Evaluating hedge fund indices as alternative investments, our analysis reveals several like  
characteristics across the industry. Specific strategies differ in their specific exposures, but overall 
the following patterns emerge which guide our understanding of the returns and the larger industry.  
1) Non-Normal Return Distribution: The indices display negative skewness and considerable 
kurtosis, indicating a left-skewed return distribution with tail losses exceeding tail gains. The 
skewness makes traditional mean-variance analyses, like Sharpe ratios, ill-conditioned, as tail 
events tend to be negative with increased variation. The monthly frequency of the data implies that 
volatility is underestimated, as daily price fluctuations are not accounted for. 
 
2) Return Decay: Over time, index returns, including the aggregate index, have decreased. 
Comparing with older statistical analyses, the average returns of the indices over their lifetime 
have decreased over the past 20 years, coinciding with large growth in hedge fund industry. This 
trend pushes new strategies to be developed to capitalize on market movements. 
 
3) Market Exposure: While most funds maintain significant excess returns over the market, 
indices wallow in bear markets. The indices display more significant exposure to losses in bear 
markets than gains in bull markets, MF being an exception. The alternative investments tend to 
gain with the market, but they will consistently dive sharply with market drops. Across market 
conditions, even hedge fund returns fluctuate. 
 
4) Systematic Risk Exposure: The indices display excess returns over traditional measures of 
systematic risks in the market. While bond spread, volatility, and oil prices do account for some 
variation in the index returns, our basis failed to capture more of the returns that desired. On our 
basis, the indices displayed similar systematic exposure compared to the S&P 500.  
 
                                                 
29 See Appendix, Figures 7&8 for an attempt. 
30 For our attempt at this holistic variation capturing, see Appendix Figures 7 and 8, a composite model of 
Models 3 and 4 in Analysis. 
5) Mutual Fund Likeness: The Carhart 4-Factor Model eliminated significant excess returns for 
half of the indices examined. The hedge funds demonstrated significant exposure to value, small 
firm, and momentum equites, which are traditionally viewed as mutual fund performance drivers. 
While not capturing as much return variation as Carhart did with mutual funds, the model 
demonstrates that money managers in both industries utilize these phenomena in their holding and 
strategy implementation. 
 
6) Diversity: Pinning down the drivers of hedge fund returns is not as clear cut as mutual funds. 
Drivers likely vary strategy to strategy and with the opaqueness that money manager invest with, 
risks might be too diversified to succinctly capture in a model. The presence of excess returns 
across Model 3 and Model 4 speaks to the unknown where money is allocated, even if it is outlined 
in a fund strategy. 
 
7) Excess return demands excess risk. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The hedge fund industry demonstrates an ability to offer significant returns, with diverse risk 
profiles and market access. Their unique exposure and return properties offer an alternative to 
vanilla investing in the S&P or bonds. However, the proposition that they offer favorable returns 
across market conditions is, on average, false. The indices still maintain exposure to bear markets 
and are adversely affected by market dives, save DSB. The indices have systematic risk exposure 
that is comparable to the market, but suffer from liquidity risk from leveraged positions during 
market downturns. Finally, hedge funds share significant exposure to variables traditionally 
associated with mutual funds, implying some inspection between manager strategy for each 
industry. Overall, hedge offer unique investment opportunities and strategy access to investors 
who don’t have the capital to support the strategies independently. Unfortunately, even these 
investments face market exposure. Alternative investments offer high average returns by taking 
on additional sources of risk in their respective strategies. Pinning down the drivers of their returns 
is ambitious because of this diversity. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Hedge Fund Strategy Breakdown31 
 
Credit Suiss Hedge Fund Index (All) – Representing the aggregate performance by the Credit 
Suisse hedge funds (outlined below), this index is a benchmark for average hedge fund 
performance. Respective strategies can be compared to this index as a measure of how closely 
correlated the fund’s returns are with broader market growth. 
 
Convertible Arbitrage (CON) – This market-neutral strategy entails taking a long position in a 
company’s convertible securities and a short position in the company’s common stock. The 
convertible security acts as insurance in case the stock price rises and the short position is out of 
the money, as the security can be redeemed for common stock and the short position closed. 
CON maintains that the convertible securities are priced less efficiently than the common stock, 
implying the opportunity for “arbitrage”. 
 
Dedicated Short Bias (DSB) – This directional trading strategy holds both long and short 
positions in market, with a larger proportion of the portfolio being short. The bias towards more 
short assets allows the portfolio to benefit from market declines, while mitigating growth during 
bull markets. The balance of long and short assets allows the portfolio to be more resilient than a 
pure dedicated short portfolio to market growth. 
 
Emerging Markets (EM) – This strategy specializes in investing in emerging country markets. 
Unlike EM mutual funds, the hedge fund strategy includes more investment options under its 
portfolio, including commodities, forex, and real estate. EM provides the investor access to 
international markets and the growth opportunities for the developing nations; however, that 
opportunity necessitates exposure to risk in foreign markets. 
 
Equity Market Neutral (EMN) – This market-neutral strategy takes a mixture of long and short 
positions in the market, based on a belief in pricing inefficiency in the portfolio’s investments. 
EMN attempts to circumvent systemic risk in the market by maintaining a beta of nearly zero. 
By maintaining long and short positions, with the appropriate hedging, the portfolio exhibits 
lower volatility than the volatility of the larger market. 
 
Event Driven (ED) – This strategy tries to take advantage of pricing inefficiencies resulting from 
corporate events; bankruptcies, acquisitions, and mergers, for instance. The uncertainty of the 
corporate event occurring provides an opportunity for ED managers to take a position in the 
company’s offerings to exploit the uncertainty. ED strategy can be further broken down into how 
the managers try to exploit the pricing uncertainty (see below). 
 
Event Driven Distressed (EDD) – This strategy is a complementary, sub-section of Event Driven 
strategy, wherein investment is focused around the securities of a firm going through distress: a 
bankruptcy or scandal for instance.  The firm’s securities – corporate bonds, for example – are 
                                                 
31 Sources: http://www.barclayhedge.com/research/educational-articles/ 
      http://www.investopedia.com/university/hedge-fund/strategies.asp 
speculated on with the belief that their value stands to decline. Accordingly, EDD tends to be 
more successful in periods where the market is performing poorly and more firms are distressed.  
 
Event Driven Mutli-Strategy (EDM) – A subsection of Event Driven strategy in which both 
positive and negative events in the corporate world are speculated on. Likely more market-
neutral than EDD, this strategy stands to gain from favorable firm events as well (positive 
earnings reports, for instance).  
 
Event Driven Risk Arbitrage (EDRA) – This subsection of Event Driven strategy tries to 
capitalize on the price change resulting from the merging of two companies. By longing the 
company lower-valued company stock and shorting the higher-valued company’s stock, the 
strategy assumes the merger will occur and the two stock prices will converge somewhere in the 
middle. However, there is risk associated with the transaction not occurring. 
 
Fixed Income Arbitrage (FIA) – This market-neutral strategy tries to exploit pricing 
inefficiencies by simultaneously selling and buying similar securities, namely bonds. As the 
prices for the securities approaches their fair value, the FIA managers settle their position to 
exploit the original inefficiency in the price. “Arbitrage” is misleading in this scenario because of 
the possibility that the company goes bankrupt, while netting small gains from the owned bonds. 
 
Global Macro (GM) – This strategy speculates on the overall political and economic climate of a 
country and buys/shorts securities according to the perception of that country. This strategy 
attempts to exploit trends in sentiment about a nation through currency exchanges and taking 
positions in the country’s indices and bond offerings. The macroeconomic events that can 
influence market direction (elections, political events, recessions…) are exploited through this 
strategy. 
 
Long/Short Equity (LS) -  This strategy entails taking long positions in stocks expected to gain 
and short positions in stocks expected to fall, with minimal market exposure in the resulting 
portfolio. The resulting portfolio can take either a long or short bias in the market, or could be 
market-neutral. Additionally, this strategy maintains flexibility as to which markets and stocks it 
takes a position in: small or large cap, domestic or foreign, any stock could be incorporated in to 
the strategy. 
 
Managed Futures (MF) – This strategy allows a money manager to allocate an investor’s assets 
according to strategies that they deem prudent. The managers, known as CTAs (Commodity 
Trading Advisors), take positions in future contracts on prominent commodities, foreign 
currencies, and indices to offer a return. The management they do is subject to heavy federal 
scrutiny to ensure they are not engaged in illicit activities. 
 
Multi-Strategy (MS) – This strategy is defined firm-to-firm and acts as a blend of all 
aforementioned hedge fund strategies. The flexibility of multi-strategy provides more access to 
opportunities in the market; however, it also exposes to fund to a diverse number of risks arising 
from all the previous strategies.  
 
 
Figure 2: Correlation Matrix for Index Returns 
Min Max 
 
- All Con DSB EM EMN ED EDD EDM EDRA FIA GM LS MF MS 
S&P 
500  
All 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
CON 0.555 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
DSB 
-
0.488 
-
0.265 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
EM 0.714 0.448 
-
0.537 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - - 
EMN 0.282 0.195 
-
0.157 0.143 1.000 - - - - - - - - - - 
ED 0.756 0.647 
-
0.584 0.702 0.289 1.000 - - - - - - - - - 
EDD 0.692 0.600 
-
0.564 0.649 0.329 0.941 1.000 - - - - - - - - 
EDM 0.757 0.632 
-
0.542 0.694 0.242 0.962 0.820 1.000 - - - - - - - 
EDRA 0.511 0.478 
-
0.465 0.509 0.165 0.683 0.600 0.667 1.000 - - - - - - 
FIA 0.542 0.779 
-
0.201 0.411 0.306 0.511 0.495 0.491 0.304 1.000 - - - - - 
GM 0.807 0.344 
-
0.105 0.450 0.064 0.387 0.340 0.414 0.231 0.401 1.000 - - - - 
LS 0.834 0.458 
-
0.699 0.674 0.199 0.750 0.680 0.737 0.598 0.376 0.448 1.000 - - - 
MF 0.198 
-
0.076 0.069 
-
0.015 
-
0.003 
-
0.022 
-
0.047 
-
0.010 
-
0.047 
-
0.054 0.311 0.081 1.000 - - 
MS 0.517 0.701 
-
0.261 0.304 0.350 0.561 0.495 0.565 0.355 0.620 0.275 0.478 0.071 1.000 - 
S&P 
500  0.573 0.368 
-
0.760 0.541 0.271 0.632 0.616 0.584 0.500 0.335 0.233 0.675 
-
0.075 0.393 1.000 
 
 This correlation matrix describes the associations between the returns of each index used 
in our analysis, the Ri’s in all the models we consider. Since some of these indices are composed 
of one another, the various event driven strategies, for example, we would expect to observe 
multicollinearity between some of these strategies. This co-movement is most consistent across 
the aggregate index, the All index of the considered hedge funds, with r’s consistently above .7. 
Additionally, the most heavily correlated returns are the pairs (ED, EDD) and (ED, EDM); with 
EDD and EDM being subsets of ED, this also aligns with our expectations. 
 Considering S&P 500 correlations, we see which strategies maintain a net long position 
(significant, positive correlation) with market returns: All, EM, ED, EDD, EDM, EDRA, LS.32 
Dedicated Short Bias, again, displays returns inversely related with S&P growth. 
 Note that Equity Market Neutral and Managed Futures maintain little correlation with both 
other hedge fund strategies and the market. By definition, EMN attempts to maintain a βMKT as 
                                                 
32 These correlations corroborate the results displayed in Tables 2 and 3, that strategies maintaining 
significant, positive βBull and βBear experience high degrees of positive market correlation. 
close to 0 as possible, so its independence is unsurprising. MF’s independence can be interpreted 
as money manager’s tendency to maintain market-neutral positions, a hedge against large market 
corrections. From an ‘alternativeness’ standpoint, EMN and MF display superior independence 
from market and other hedge fund methodologies. 
 
 
Figure 3: Summary Statistics of Strictly Bull S&P Months  
Column Min Column Max 
 
Summary Statistics: Credit Suiss Hedge Fund Indices Monthly Return 
Data: Strictly Bull S&P Market 
Methodology Mu Sigma Skewness Kurtosis Min Max 
Non- Adj. 
Sharpe 
Ratio* 
All 1.4290 1.6908 0.3544 3.2741 -4.6807 8.1837 0.8452 
CON 0.9098 1.3377 -0.1956 3.6310 -4.7883 5.6450 0.6801 
DSB -2.7366 3.2728 -0.0204 -0.2236 -11.9704 5.0261 -0.8362 
EM 1.8794 3.5164 -0.1292 3.1774 -10.5153 15.1995 0.5345 
EMN 0.9045 0.9415 0.3620 0.4491 -1.3634 3.5928 0.9607 
ED 1.4115 1.1364 -0.6600 1.4564 -3.0078 4.1321 1.2421 
EDD 1.4931 1.1945 -0.4090 0.7015 -2.5718 4.0691 1.2500 
EDM 1.3673 1.3691 -0.6045 2.4467 -4.8530 4.6703 0.9987 
EDRA 0.8181 0.9383 -0.0245 1.1279 -2.3785 3.7396 0.8719 
FIA 0.7033 1.1037 -2.6387 18.1636 -7.2191 4.2436 0.6372 
GM 1.2843 2.6152 -0.2047 6.4303 -12.2745 9.9507 0.4911 
LS 1.9074 2.0060 0.9880 4.3020 -4.0618 12.2284 0.9509 
MF 0.6774 3.2174 -0.3636 0.4244 -9.8211 9.0409 0.2105 
MS 1.0109 1.2105 -1.4806 4.9184 -4.8737 4.1882 0.8352 
S&P 500  
3.2624 2.3219 0.8847 0.2663 0.0087 10.7723 1.4050 
 
 By only taking consideration of months where the S&P 500 had positive returns, we 
generated the table above for comparison with Table 1 of raw return data. Generally, we see 
marked improvement to average monthly return, DSB being an outlier, and lowered volatility 
across the returns. Accordingly, non-RF-adjusted Sharpe Ratios (simply Mu/sigma) show dramatic 
improvements during these bull months; across all indices, they improve by an average of over 
160%.  
 For strategies which display significant, positive βBull’s (EM, ED, EDD, EDM, EDRA, 
and LS), this table defines the “best case” return properties for these funds. Volatility is reduced 
by the presence of fewer negative returns, and mu increases appropriately. Investors considering 
the potential of these hedge fund strategies can look to the average performance outlined above 
and ask themselves, “What if this is as good as it gets?’  
 
 
Figure 4: Summary Statistics of Strictly Bear S&P Months 
Column Min Column Max 
 
Summary Statistics: Credit Suiss Hedge Fund Indices Monthly Return 
Data: Strictly Bear S&P Market 
Methodology Mu Sigma Skewness Kurtosis Min Max 
Non- Adj. 
Sharpe 
Ratio* 
All -0.5875 2.0063 -0.6048 4.3817 -7.8493 6.2870 -0.2928 
CON 
-0.0352 2.5630 -3.0497 14.2143 -13.4583 5.5595 -0.0137 
DSB 3.3778 4.1206 0.5321 2.8072 -9.0448 20.4667 0.8197 
EM 
-1.6072 4.1256 -2.7611 13.4433 -26.1703 5.8665 -0.3896 
EMN -0.4984 5.4784 -9.0476 85.3922 -51.8404 1.8195 -0.0910 
ED -0.4359 2.0686 -2.7587 12.3201 -12.5274 2.2775 -0.2107 
EDD 
-0.3683 2.1696 -2.7581 13.1596 -13.3015 3.0709 -0.1698 
EDM -0.4619 2.1773 -2.3152 9.3222 -12.2442 4.2903 -0.2121 
EDRA 
-0.0780 1.3099 -1.3154 5.4937 -6.3521 3.4618 -0.0596 
FIA -0.0257 2.1454 -4.7080 28.0438 -15.1235 1.9987 -0.0120 
GM 0.1732 2.5184 -0.2303 2.9817 -7.2281 10.0721 0.0688 
LS 
-1.2255 2.6175 -0.3014 6.9077 -12.1433 10.5640 -0.4682 
MF 0.1526 3.4871 0.3474 -0.2614 -7.5469 9.4873 0.0438 
MS 
0.0302 1.7023 -1.9686 7.1877 -7.6311 3.5419 0.0177 
S&P 500  
-3.7144 3.2080 -1.5821 3.1341 -16.9425 -0.0143 -1.1579 
 
 By only taking consideration of months where the S&P 500 had net negative returns we 
generate the table above, the complement of Figure 3. Compared with Figure 3, there are paltry 
non-adjusted Sharpe Ratios and higher volatilities, as losses tend to be more severe and spread 
out.33 With the exception of MF, MS, and GM, average return flipped sign for the strategies, with 
DSB benefitting immensely from bear market conditions. 
 For strategies which displayed significant, positive βBear’s, this table represents a worst 
case scenario for monthly return properties. Note that every methodology, except DSB and MF, is 
exposed to market decline; this table corresponds to a worst case for a majority of the indices. 
 
 
Figure 5: Correlation Matrix of Macro Model Regressors 
Min Max 
 
X-vars ∆𝐔𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐩 ∆𝐖𝐓𝐈 ∆𝐕𝐗𝐎 ∆𝐒𝐑 ∆𝐁𝐒 ∆𝐓𝐒 ∆𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝 ∆𝐌𝟏 
∆𝐔𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐩 1 - - - - - - - 
∆𝐖𝐓𝐈 -0.0661 1 - - - - - - 
∆𝐕𝐗𝐎 -0.0535 -0.2846 1 - - - - - 
∆𝐒𝐑 -0.0117 -0.1153 0.0509 1 - - - - 
∆𝐁𝐒 0.0488 -0.4432 0.3764 0.0972 1 - - - 
∆𝐓𝐒 0.0780 0.1465 -0.0086 -0.0262 0.0002 1 - - 
∆𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝 0.0874 0.1256 0.1214 -0.0096 -0.1237 -0.1234 1 - 
∆𝐌𝟏 -0.0038 -0.1483 0.1176 0.1281 0.1435 -0.0638 0.2008 1 
 
Model 3:     𝐑𝐢 =   𝛂 + (𝛃𝐔𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐩 ∗ 𝐱𝟏𝐢) + (𝛃𝐖𝐓𝐈 ∗ 𝐱𝟐𝐢) + (𝛃𝐕𝐗𝐎 ∗ 𝐱𝟑𝐢) + (𝛃𝐒𝐑 ∗ 𝐱𝟒𝐢) + (𝛃𝐁𝐒 ∗
𝐱𝟓𝐢) + (𝛃𝐓𝐒 ∗ 𝐱𝟔𝐢) + (𝛃𝐆𝐨𝐥𝐝 ∗ 𝐱𝟕𝐢) + (𝛃𝐌𝟏 ∗ 𝐱𝟖𝐢) + 𝛆𝐢 
 
 Note that all the x-variables we consider for our regression are deltas: month-over-month 
changes in our desired regressors, for ease of beta interpretation in our analysis. Additionally, each 
variable delta corresponds to an 𝑥𝑘𝑖 in our model, according to the appropriate beta coefficient; 
hence, 𝒙𝟏𝒊 corresponds to ∆𝐔𝐧𝐞𝐦𝐩, 𝒙𝟐𝒊 corresponds to ∆𝐖𝐓𝐈, and so on, again for ease of beta 
interpretation in our analysis. 
 Examining our correlations, we find no evidence of multicollinearity across our regressors. 
With the maxima in |r| between the pairs (Bond Spread, West Texas Oil Index) and (Bond Spread, 
VXO), we find only moderate correlations and no basis for subtractive predictive power between 
regressors. We concluded that these variables provide a cross section of systematic risk within the 
market, with little subtraction between predictive power. Hence, they became our basis for our 
macro model examining exposure to systematic risk across hedge fund returns. 
                                                 
33 Consider skewness and kurtosis in Table 1 and Figure 2 of Analysis. 
Figure 6: Autocorrelation Matrix for Hedge Fund Indices 
Column Min Column Max 
 
 
Monthly 
Returns     
Quarterly 
Returns     
Yearly 
Returns   
Strategy 
1-Month 
Lag 
2-Month 
Lag 
3-Month 
Lag 1-Q Lag 2-Q Lag 4-Q Lag 1-Y Lag 2-Y Lag 
All 0.2095 0.1061 0.0560 0.2134 0.0675 -0.1358 -0.2372 -0.0815 
CON 0.5552 0.2953 0.1562 0.4219 0.0158 -0.1191 -0.3105 -0.2646 
DSB 0.0854 -0.0453 -0.0183 -0.0455 -0.0935 -0.1154 -0.1378 -0.1969 
EM 0.3010 0.0539 0.0442 0.1084 -0.1215 -0.1092 -0.4962 -0.1052 
EMN 0.0543 0.0305 0.1360 0.1610 -0.0394 0.0376 0.0745 0.0986 
ED 0.3615 0.2168 0.1598 0.2752 -0.0241 -0.1119 -0.3101 -0.2394 
EDD 0.3938 0.2430 0.1649 0.3111 -0.0190 -0.1059 -0.2654 -0.0180 
EDM 0.3140 0.1944 0.1468 0.2517 -0.0125 -0.1250 -0.3334 -0.3727 
EDRA 0.2784 0.0162 -0.0271 0.0433 0.1401 -0.0553 0.0684 -0.0682 
FIA 0.5232 0.2016 0.1148 0.3093 -0.0197 -0.0863 -0.2913 -0.2288 
GM 0.0922 0.0453 0.0725 0.1870 0.1348 -0.0776 -0.0121 -0.0806 
LS 0.1945 0.0733 0.0061 0.0866 0.0027 -0.0749 -0.0850 -0.1288 
MF 0.0332 -0.1092 -0.0949 -0.1684 -0.1791 -0.1588 -0.3792 0.1973 
MS 0.3269 0.2199 0.1782 0.3048 -0.0391 -0.1262 -0.3320 -0.2071 
S&P 500  0.0812 -0.0251 0.0984 0.0869 0.0620 0.0658 0.1218 -0.0495 
 
For a k-period lag:  𝐑𝐢 =  𝐑𝐢−𝐤 + 𝛆𝐢 
 
 The correlations above characterize persistence across hedge fund strategies, a corollary to 
the Carhart 4-factor model analysis.34 By considering the autocorrelations of each fund, we can 
accurately gauge momentum in fund growth, based on the available data frequency (monthly).  
 In the 1-Month Lag framework, we see strong evidence of persistence for the two arbitrage 
strategies (Convertible and Fixed Income) and moderate evidence for event driven strategies, as 
well as Multi-Strategy and Emerging Markets. With net positive average returns for these funds, 
positive autocorrelation is a desirable characteristic, as the fund efficiently maintains gains. The 
2-Month Lag autocorrelations show reduced persistence across the funds mentioned above and 
next to no persistence in the other funds considered. Even the highest 2-month auto correlation, in 
                                                 
34 With 𝛃𝐌𝐎𝐌 , the model measure return exposure to market securities with persistent returns. Hence, 
funds using this tactic can be seen plainly, implying that expert money management may not be the 
source of the fund’s returns. For our autocorrelation analysis, |r| >.3 will be considered significant. 
Convertible Arbitrage, shows only moderate persistence with previous returns, at +0.2953. 3-
Month lags show little return persistence across all strategies. 
 Net quarterly returns display little autocorrelation for 2-Quarter and 4-Quarter lag times. 
However, for a 1-Q lag, momentum is displayed for CON, ED, EDD, EDM, FIA, and MS; note 
that these funds are a subset of the funds that display monthly momentum with a 1-month lag. 
From a momentum standpoint, these funds demonstrate the most consistent returns over time, 
considering different periodic returns and lag times. Unfortunately, this conclusion is confounded 
by consideration of annual returns. 
Differing from the monthly and quarterly, annual returns are predominantly negative; in 
fact, there are no significant positive autocorrelations among annual returns, regardless of lag time, 
with a positive max of .1973. For 1-Y lags, significant negative autocorrelations for CON, EM, 
ED, EDM, MF, MS indicate that a fund with a positive yield over the last year will revert to have 
losses over the coming year, and vice versa. Even funds that display monthly and quarterly 
momentum do not maintain their annual returns. While this draws attention to aggregate money 
managers’ expertise, the finding exposes the high degree of volatility associated with these funds; 
investments in hedge funds fundamentally should not be actively managed, specifically because 
of the expectation for growth swings and inconsistent returns. 
Hence, we conclude that some hedge fund indices, namely the arbitrages, the event driven, 
EM, and MS, display momentum in their returns, but only over very short lag times.  
Unfortunately, annual returns indicate that short term persistence may be offset by expected losses 
in the future. Broadly speaking, there is momentum in hedge fund returns, but calling it persistence 
may be a mischaracterization. 
 
 
Figures 7&8: Composite Model, Correlation Matrix and Betas 
 
This composite model incorporates the 3 most significant regressors from the Macro model and 
Carhart model, respectively. The goal of this model is to eliminate significant excess returns from 
the indices and capture the most variation of an industry whose returns demonstrate broad 
exposure. Model 5 is outlined below for the composite. 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 5:     𝐑𝐢 = 𝛂 + (𝛃𝐖𝐓𝐈 ∗ 𝐱𝟏𝐢) + (𝛃𝐕𝐗𝐎 ∗ 𝐱𝟐𝐢) + (𝛃𝐁𝐒 ∗ 𝐱𝟑𝐢) +  (𝛃𝐌𝐊𝐓−𝐑𝐅 ∗ 𝐱𝟒𝐢) +  (𝛃𝐒𝐌𝐁 ∗
𝐱𝟓𝐢) + (𝛃𝐇𝐌𝐋 ∗ 𝐱𝟔𝐢) + (𝛃𝐌𝐎𝐌 ∗ 𝐱𝟕𝐢) + 𝛆𝐢 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Correlation Matrix 
X-vars ∆𝐖𝐓𝐈 ∆𝐕𝐗𝐎 ∆𝐁𝐒 𝐌𝐊𝐓 − 𝐑𝐅 𝐒𝐌𝐁 𝐇𝐌𝐋 𝐌𝐎𝐌 
∆𝐖𝐓𝐈 1.0000 - - - - - - 
∆𝐕𝐗𝐎 -0.2846 1.0000 - - - - - 
∆𝐁𝐒 -0.4432 0.3764 1.0000 - - - - 
𝐌𝐊𝐓 − 𝐑𝐅 
0.2318 -0.2394 -0.3516 1.0000 - - - 
𝐒𝐌𝐁 0.0824 0.0112 -0.1145 0.1972 1.0000 - - 
𝐇𝐌𝐋 -0.0047 0.1419 0.0478 -0.1921 -0.3446 1.0000 - 
𝐌𝐎𝐌 -0.0887 0.1876 0.2280 -0.2719 -0.1907 0.0281 1.0000 
 
 Here again, we say no evidence of serial correlation across our variable basis, so we 
continue with our multiple regression, trying to capture additional return variation in our models. 
 
Figure 8: Composite Model Betas    
Strategy 𝛂 𝛃𝐖𝐓𝐈 𝛃𝐕𝐗𝐎 𝛃𝐁𝐒  𝛃𝐌𝐊𝐓−𝐑𝐅 𝛃𝐒𝐌𝐁 𝛃𝐇𝐌𝐋 𝛃𝐌𝐎𝐌 
All 0.4383 0.0264 0.0915 -5.2567 0.2878 0.0200 0.0113 0.1280 
CON 0.4709 0.0620 0.0606 -8.6376 0.0901 -0.0102 0.0781 -0.0059 
DSB 0.0653 0.0130 -0.0801 -3.0642 -0.8858 -0.1873 0.0607 -0.0483 
EM 0.2424 -0.0107 0.0623 -7.2956 0.5026 0.1060 -0.0222 0.1189 
EMN 0.2109 0.1470 0.2562 -5.2178 0.1828 0.0183 0.1494 -0.0378 
ED 0.5263 0.0198 0.0671 -4.2285 0.2485 0.0833 0.0771 0.0504 
EDD 0.6202 0.0134 0.0627 -3.7753 0.2441 0.0949 0.0670 0.0308 
EDM 0.4699 0.0244 0.0736 -4.6752 0.2561 0.0724 0.0897 0.0676 
EDRA 0.3739 0.0303 -0.0262 -0.4194 0.1303 0.0291 0.0594 0.0167 
FIA 0.3514 0.0545 0.0958 -6.6119 0.0783 0.0046 0.0721 0.0017 
GM 0.7183 0.0145 0.0720 -4.9712 0.1496 -0.0217 0.0109 0.1169 
LS 0.3815 0.0356 0.0605 -4.2455 0.4674 0.0728 -0.0491 0.2061 
MF 0.4577 -0.0410 0.0674 -2.8235 -0.0322 0.0361 0.0087 0.1117 
MS 0.5622 0.0507 0.0914 -6.2283 0.0961 0.0061 0.0427 0.0213 
S&P 500  0.0875 -0.0020 0.0050 0.3212 0.9598 -0.1082 0.0003 -0.0518 
        
Significance* 
 
Our composite model actually suffers from convoluted variables; the simple Carhart 4-factor 
explained more variation than this mode, even if the funds demonstrate significant exposure across 
a wider array of variables. The number of funds displaying excess returns speaks to the diversity 
of exposures that hedge funds maintain to accrue their returns. 
